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Nietzsche and the Neoconservatives

Fukuyama's Reply to the Last Man

HAROON SHEIKH

One of the most lively fields in recent Nietzsche scholarship has been the theme of Nietzsche and politics. Within this field, the appropriation of Nietzsche by the political Left has been especially prominent. Authors in the field of radical democracy have shown how Nietzsche's philosophy can serve as inspiration for their project. One theme these authors discuss is Nietzsche's critique of traditional concepts and rigidities in society, and it is precisely this that distanced thinkers on the political Right from Nietzsche. This can be seen from the ambiguous attitude toward Nietzsche in the work of conservative intellectuals. Allan Bloom, for instance, argues that Nietzsche saw the crisis of modernity but contributed to it himself by declaring the concepts of morality to be human projections with no objective basis in nature.¹ However, mostly in the United States, a field of research has emerged in which the political Right is appropriating Nietzsche. Within this field, Leo Strauss was among the first to take up Nietzsche. In the following I will focus particularly on Strauss's student Francis Fukuyama and his recent confrontation with Nietzsche within the neoconservative tradition.² The term *neoconservative* is of relatively recent date, and Strauss has never described himself as such. The label was developed by followers of his work. Fukuyama draws support from neoconservative predecessors such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and Nathan Glazer. As we shall see, a theme that ties Fukuyama to them is his emphasis on the importance of traditional culture in modern societies. Another central tenet of neoconservatism that Fukuyama adheres to is a skepticism concerning state intervention. In his most recent book, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, Fukuyama distances himself from the "practical" neoconservatives of the Bush administration. In chapter 1, he identifies four common principles of neoconservatism he adheres to: (1) a concern with democracy, human rights, and the internal politics of states (in contrast with "realist" international relations); (2) a belief that U.S. power can be used for moral purposes; (3) skepticism about the capacities of international law and institutions; and (4) the concern that ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences, undermining its own ends.³ Hence, in contrast with classical realists like Henry Kissinger and in agreement with the ideologists of the Bush administration, Fukuyama does believe that the United States

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could and should use its power against human rights abuses abroad. However, he differs from the Bush administration on its approach to Iraq. A critical flaw there has been the belief in the possibility of establishing a working democracy *ex nihilo*. This contradicts the fourth principle of what Fukuyama believes to be the neoconservative legacy. In his earlier book *State Building*, this principle was one of the central arguments.⁴

In this article I will explore the way Nietzsche has been taken up in neoconservative thought by looking at the work of Francis Fukuyama and his teacher Leo Strauss. Fukuyama interprets Nietzsche's social theory that culminates in the idea of the last man as a theory of the decline of *thymos* in the modern world. This appropriation of Nietzsche opens interesting perspectives on contemporary phenomena, even if, as I will argue in my first section, it involves only a partial understanding of the concerns Nietzsche was addressing. I argue that a line of reasoning in Nietzsche's late philosophy, the project of *grosse Politik*, can be understood as a response to this development. In subsequent sections, I examine the way neoconservative thought has responded to this idea of the decline of *thymos*. Strauss agrees with Nietzsche's diagnosis but does not follow him in his project of *grosse Politik*, leading him to a skeptical position on the possibility for human flourishing in the modern age. Fukuyama, on the other hand, takes issue with the depiction of the modern world as the preeminence of the last man. In three different lines of argumentation, Fukuyama contends that an eclipse of *thymos* is not the necessary outcome of modernity. If *grosse Politik* is Nietzsche's answer to the eclipse of *thymos*, yet *grosse Politik* is not something we wish to endorse, Fukuyama's reply to the idea of the last man provides an interesting starting point for a confrontation with Nietzsche. In the final section, I examine the broader context of Fukuyama's appropriation of Nietzsche. Interpreting Nietzsche as a spokesman for *thymos* misses Nietzsche's central concern with nihilism. This neglect will be discussed in the context of Fukuyama's other works in order to push the confrontation between Fukuyama and Nietzsche a step further and identify what at core differentiates them, namely, their analyses of the process of secularization.

The Ascendancy of the Last Man and the Eclipse of *Thymos*

Both Leo Strauss and Francis Fukuyama take Nietzsche's concept of the last man as a central theme in their analysis of the modern world. Both seek to interpret Nietzsche in terms of the classical tradition of political theory, which they oppose to modern political theory that sought to banish the concept of *thymos* from political thought.⁵ For several reasons, Fukuyama believes that *thymos* can serve as a fruitful point of departure for understanding human behavior and politics specifically. Modern political theory in the tradition of Hobbes and

Locke analyzes man's nature in terms of the combination of reason with the passions (or desires). By turning to Plato, Strauss and Fukuyama seek to revive that part of the soul Plato called *thymos*.⁶ This part of the soul is the seat of pride, that which makes human beings seek recognition from others, gives them courage and the need for prestige and honor, and makes it possible for them to defy the desire for self-preservation. By contrast, the desire for self-preservation is what Hobbes declared to be the essence of human existence.⁷ According to Fukuyama, although Hobbes acknowledged the existence of what Fukuyama calls *thymos*, he largely denounced it as *vainglory*, calling it the fighting "for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue."⁸ In a similar vein, modern psychoanalysis interprets human drives primarily in terms of eros and self-preservation. And as Peter Sloterdijk argues, the phenomena of *thymos* are interpreted by psychoanalysts as the sublimation of unfulfilled sexual desires.⁹ It is against this line of thinking in modern social and political theory that Strauss and Fukuyama seek to rehabilitate *thymos*.

The concept is also used by Fukuyama for his distinction between capitalism and democracy. In part 2 of *The End of History and the Last Man*, Fukuyama proposes a materialist theory to explain how the existence of modern science leads to a capitalist organization of society. Yet a theory based purely on economic motivation cannot account for another phenomenon of the modern world, namely, the emergence of liberal democracy. It is perfectly possible to have prosperity and high growth rates under autocracies like those seen in Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan. The rise of liberal democracy is, according to Fukuyama, based on the "struggle for recognition." It is not from economic motivation but from *thymos* that democracies arise.¹⁰

Finally, the theme of *thymos* is also important in Fukuyama's appropriation of Hegel (or more specifically, Kojève's interpretation of Hegel) and of Nietzsche, both of whom, according to Strauss and Fukuyama, acknowledge the existence and importance of *thymos*. They appropriate Nietzsche as a thinker who warns of the coming of the last man, understood as the figure representing the eclipse of *thymos* in modernity. Indeed, Zarathustra speaks of the advent of a time when human greatness has vanished (e.g., Z P:5). It is this suggestion that Strauss and Fukuyama take up as representing Nietzsche's view on history. It has to be noted from the start that it is not clear that this was Nietzsche's unequivocal position. In *BGE*, for instance, Nietzsche speaks of the possibilities that humankind still holds, and in the same work he even claims that democracy can offer good conditions for human greatness (*BGE* 200, 242). Moreover, Nietzsche often wrote of great individuals as "pieces of luck," implying that they are always possible (see *KSA* 13:11[414], 14[123], 14[133]; *A* 3).¹¹ There are thus several passages in Nietzsche's work in which he argues that modernity does not imply the eclipse of human greatness. Strauss and Fukuyama focus on a *single strand* in Nietzsche's thought that concerns the eclipse of *thymos* in modernity.

According to them, Nietzsche's critique of modernity stems from a call to revive the *thymiotic* parts of the soul as a separate source of motivation and a central concept of politics. In the words of Fukuyama: "Nietzsche's well-known doctrine of the 'will to power' can be understood as the effort to reassert the primacy of *thymos* as against desire and reason, and to undo the damage that modern liberalism has done to man's pride and self-assertiveness."¹² The following passage from the preface to *Z* exhibits how the figure of the last man represents a decline of *thymos*, as humankind loses the capacity for striving and has lost ambition and willpower:

Alas! The time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whirl! I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself, to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves. Alas! The time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you *the last man*. "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?"—thus asks the last man, and he blinks. (*Z* P:5)¹³

Hardship is evaded by the last man, who neglects thymiotic drives and seeks instead to fulfill petty desires: "'We have invented happiness'—say the last men and blink. They have left the places, where it is tough to live: as one needs warmth. One loves the neighbor and rubs oneself close to him: as one needs warmth" (*Z* P:5). In a passage in the *Nachlass*, Nietzsche elaborates on this concept of happiness. He writes of a herd morality that "with all its strength strives after universal green pasture—happiness on earth, namely security, lack of danger, comfort, lightness of life and finally 'when all is well,' also hopes to relieve itself of all forms of shépherds and bellwethers." He goes on to say that the modern age wants "comfort, publicity, the noise of actors, and servitude to the grandest of lies, the equality of people" (*KSA* 11:37[8]).

In another passage of the *Nachlass*, Nietzsche discusses the effects of tyrannical societies. He argues that outer tension is a prerequisite for the cultivation of strong individuals. The modern lack of tension will have a weakening of humanity as a consequence. After having discussed the conditions of modern philosophers, he says of the "higher artists": "Will they not then for the most part go to ground through inner lack of discipline? They are no longer tyrannized from the outside, by the absolute tables of values of a church or a court: so that they no longer learn to develop their 'inner tyrants,' their *wills*" (*KSA* 11:37[14]). In *BGE*, Nietzsche states that the decay of political organization is linked with democracy and leads to the "diminution of man" (*Verkleinerung* [*BGE* 203]). Echoing Hobbes's depiction of man, in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* Nietzsche links democracy to cleverness (*Klugheit*) and selfishness (*Eigennutz* [*HH* 472]).

Hence in the modern democratic world, according to Nietzsche, herd morality prevails. This is a morality that seeks comfort and evades danger and discipline.

In such a world man's inner tyrants are no longer developed and the capacity for striving diminishes. In terms of classical political theory, it is the decline of *thymos* and the domination of the appetites. Nietzsche's project of *grosse Politik* can be interpreted as a response to this analysis.

Nietzsche's Response to the Last Man

In *Also sprach Zarathustra*, Nietzsche opposes the last man to the *Übermensch*. In the following, however, I will focus on the more political ideas developed by Nietzsche under the rubric of *grosse Politik*. The program of *grosse Politik* and the *Übermensch* are intimately connected, but I can only briefly indicate this link here.¹⁴ *Grosse Politik* is not Nietzsche's definitive response to modernity's crisis. Nor is it clear how he envisioned this project or how it relates to more apolitical currents in his philosophy. What I am arguing here is that *grosse Politik* is a certain response that Nietzsche developed to the crisis of modernity, one that can be connected to neoconservative thought and its theme of the decline of *thymos*.

Following the passage quoted above on the concept of happiness under modern democratic conditions, Nietzsche goes on to discuss the conditions under which humankind has flourished. He writes:

Whoever has thought thoroughly about where and how the plant man has up to now grown most powerfully, must concede, that this has happened under the reverse [*umgekehrten*] conditions: that for this the danger of his situation must grow tremendously, his power to contrive and to disguise must struggle to assert themselves under long-lasting pressure and compulsion, his life-will must be intensified to an unconditional will to power and dominance [*Übermacht*], and that danger, hardness, violence, danger on the street as in the heart, inequality of rights, concealment, Stoicism, the art of seduction, devilishness of every kind, in short the opposite of all herd preferences are necessary for the enhancement of the type man. (*KSA* 11:37[8])¹⁵

So according to Nietzsche, tension and discipline are necessary conditions for the creation of higher individuals with powerful wills. In modernity, these conditions are absent as modern human beings follow only petty desires. In other words, Nietzsche describes the dominance of the erotic part of the soul (the appetites) or, in contemporary terms, the life of the consumer.

In the period after *Z*, Nietzsche realizes that the revaluation of all values has to be connected with political or institutional underpinnings. This is because the supreme dominance of herd values is so strong that, if left to chance, the creators of new values will succumb to herd morality: "I. Zarathustra can only *bring joy* after an order of rank is established. At first, the latter is *taught*. II. The order of rank followed through into a system of earth-governance: the lords of the earth in the end, a new ruling caste. Emerging from them here and

there, entirely an Epicurean god, the *Übermensch*, the transfigurer of existence" (KSA 11:35[73]). It is not entirely clear what Nietzsche intends by the phrases "earth-governance" or "new ruling caste." In some passages he seems to take it quite literally. Fredrick Appel argues in *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* that Nietzsche sought to create some form of inner circle of aristocrats, ruling over the rest of mankind, uninhibited by rules or moral obligations.¹⁶ On the other hand, Urs Marti shows how Nietzsche was averse to the public sphere.¹⁷ Several passages point toward a relationship of educators or lawgivers operating in the field of values rather than political rulers operating with force. This seems to be corroborated by a late note: "**Governing point of view:** to open up *distances*, but *not to create oppositions*. To dissolve the *intermediate forms* and diminish their influence: chief means to maintain distances" (KSA 12:10[63]; emphases in the original). And consider: "I want to create a new class: an order of higher humans with whom those of troubled spirit and conscience can take counsel; who like me know not only how to live beyond political and religious doctrines, but have also overcome morality" (KSA 11:26[173]). What is clear from these passages is that this class has to be strictly separated from the rest of mankind. If the new caste is not separated, individuals will likely succumb to herd morality. For Nietzsche, the weakening of mankind is a fundamental characteristic of modernity. In the previous section, we have connected this to the decline of *thymos*. Within the modern world, the discipline that creates strong individuals is weakened, and it can be preserved only through a radical countermovement: "I bring the war. *Not* between people and people *Not* between classes I bring the war that goes through all absurd circumstance of people, class, race, occupation, upbringing, education: a war like that between rise and decline, between will to live and *vengefulness* against life" (KSA 13:25[1]). Again, the belligerent terminology should probably not be taken literally and seems to refer more to the "spiritual wars" discussed in *EH* "Destiny" 1. The passage above discusses a decline of mankind, a vengefulness against life. Only in the form of a countermovement, a class separated from the rest of humankind, assuming a kind of educational leadership, can the strength and discipline of "the plant man," what Strauss and Fukuyama would call *thymos*, be regained.

This project of creating a new ruling class, separated from the rest of humanity, may not be very appealing to many. However, it is important to note that the project follows with a strict logic from Nietzsche's diagnosis of the present. If human life for Nietzsche can be characterized in terms of *thymos*, then his argument is that as a consequence of modern morality, or the "democratic spirit," *thymos* will perish. Hence, the only way to preserve it is to create a separate class based on the principles of discipline, tension, and the fostering of strength. Against this background Nietzsche developed his project of *grosse Politik*.

The Neoconservative Response I: Leo Strauss

Nietzsche's analysis of the decline of *thymos* has been taken up by the neoconservative movement and came to Fukuyama through the work of Leo Strauss. Strauss is mostly famous for his in-depth analyses of the great thinkers in the history of political philosophy. He never wrote a book on Nietzsche, although Nietzsche plays a central role in his thought. According to Strauss, Nietzsche represents both the third wave of modernization and the second crisis of modernity. The first wave of modernization started with Machiavelli, who reduced moral and political issues to technical problems and developed a new concept of nature. Rousseau represents the second wave of modernization, as well as the first crisis of modernity. Central to this crisis is the antinomy between nature on the one hand (experienced as the beatific sentiment of existence) and civil society, reason, morality, and history on the other hand. With Nietzsche comes the discovery of history, the critique of reason, and the insight into the tragic character of historical existence.¹⁸

Strauss often takes up Nietzsche's depiction of modernity and its advocates as culminating in the weakening of mankind. For instance, he writes, "The last man, the lowest and most decayed man, the herd man without any ideals and aspirations, but well fed, well clothed, well housed, well medicated by ordinary physicians and by psychiatrists is Marx's man of the future seen from an anti-Marxist point of view."¹⁹ In another passage, he makes a similar Nietzschean point regarding recognition when he criticizes the desirability of the Hegelian/Marxian "End-State." In a letter to Kojève of 1947, he writes, "The recognition for which great men of action strive, is admiration. That recognition is not necessarily satisfied by the End-State. The fact that great deeds are impossible in the End-State, can lead precisely the best to a nihilistic denial of the End-State."²⁰ Yet the impossibility of great deeds in the End-State does not lead the political theorist Strauss to follow Nietzsche in his project of *grosse Politik*. Even if the "best" could be led to a nihilistic denial of the End-State, Strauss does not see the possibility or desirability of creating a refuge for *thymos* separated from the world of the last man. In the last analysis, Strauss sees little prospects for *thymos* and political action in the modern world. In studying the tradition of natural rights and transcendent truth, he seeks to discern whether these traditions can give any direction. At the same time, however, he realizes that these traditions can hardly be revitalized against the backdrop of the modern worldview, as he states in *Natural Right and History*.²¹ Strauss often declared his skepticism in his correspondence with Alexandre Kojève, who argued for a Hegelian/Marxist interpretation of history. This correspondence is the central inspiration for Fukuyama's 1991 seminal book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. The following fragment from a letter by Strauss to Kojève from 1957 ends almost with the title of the book: "The root of the question is I suppose the same as it

always was, that you are convinced of the truth of Hegel (Marx) and I am not. You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as ‘the last man’?”²² The “Hegelian-Marxian end” that Kojève embraced is described by Strauss as the victory of the last man. Just like Strauss, Fukuyama takes up Nietzsche’s analysis of the last man as representing an eclipse of *thymos*. However, unlike Strauss, Fukuyama is not led to skepticism regarding the prospects for *thymos* in the modern world. Whereas some neoconservatives have been led away from such skepticism to a project of “rule by the strong” loosely styled on Nietzsche’s *grosse Politik*, Fukuyama takes issue with Nietzsche’s account of the decline of *thymos* at the end of history.²³ Although his arguments may not be entirely satisfying, he discerns three refuges of *thymos* within the modern world that together may be an alternative to the Scylla of *skepsis* and the Charybdis of *grosse Politik*.

The Neoconservative Response II: Fukuyama

I. ISOTHYMIA

Fukuyama takes up Nietzsche’s ideas as a social theory on the decline of *thymos*. However, rather than seeing *thymos* as abolished, Fukuyama argues that only certain forms are precluded by modernity. He agrees with the Nietzschean idea of the decline of *thymos* at the end of history. Due to the end of struggle and the pacification of man, the powerful and violent types like Caesar and Alexander but also the great creative types—artists and writers such as Homer, Michelangelo, or Pascal—can no longer come into existence.²⁴ However, Fukuyama argues that this pacification of man does not amount to the world of the last man. In three ways, Fukuyama argues that forms of *thymos* persist in the modern world, elevating modern man’s status above that of the last man. Fukuyama’s first response is his analysis of the thymiotic form specifically attached to modern democracy. We need to make a distinction between *megalothymia* and *isothymia*. *Thymos* denotes the field of pride, honor, distinction, and recognition. Fukuyama states that *megalothymia* is the striving “to be recognized as superior.” This inspired the citizens of the Greek *poleis* and is central in all warrior ethics. It is distinguished from *isothymia*, which is “the desire to be recognized as equal to others” and as having an intrinsic worth or dignity.²⁵ This latter form of *thymos* is linked to the advent of modern democracy.

Thus, while Fukuyama agrees with Nietzsche that *megalothymia* has been tamed in the modern world, he takes issue with the idea that this represents the eclipse of *thymos* altogether by drawing attention to the phenomenon of *isothymia*. As we have seen, democracy is part of the weakening of mankind in modernity for Nietzsche (*BGE* 203). Throughout most of his work, he criticized democracy heavily.²⁶ In *GS*, he states that in democratic ages the organizational capacities

of man diminish and men become play actors (*GS* 354). Moreover, in *GM*, he situates the French Revolution within the “slave revolt in morality” (*GM* I:16). The last man is contemptible because he has lost his capacity for striving. He is driven by his petty desires and is guided by instrumental reason. Herd morality is motivated by a longing for security, lack of danger, comfort, and lightness of life (*KSA* 11:37[8]). How does this relate to Fukuyama’s analysis of modern democracy? The Nietzschean characterization of modern democracy is aligned with interpretations of modern politics in Hobbes and Locke, which Fukuyama contrasts with his Hegelian/Kojévian interpretation. He points out the striking similarities between Hobbes’s “state of nature” and Hegel’s bloody battle to the death, as well as the appreciation both have for the way men can fight for “trifles” and the importance they attribute to the instinct for self-preservation.²⁷ However, where they fundamentally differ “is in the relative moral weight assigned to the passions of pride and vanity”: “Hegel ... believes that the willingness to risk one’s life in a battle for pure prestige is in some sense what makes human beings human, the foundation of human freedom Hobbes, on the other hand, finds nothing whatsoever morally redeeming in the pride (or more properly, vanity) of the aristocratic master: indeed, it is precisely this desire for recognition, this willingness to fight over a ‘trifle’ like a medal or a flag, that is the source of all violence and human misery in the state of nature.”²⁸ For Hobbes, the strongest human passion is the fear of violent death and the strongest imperative for man is self-preservation. Hobbes provides an interpretation of modern politics in terms of bourgeois selfishness, as does Locke. This characterization is aligned with Nietzsche’s depiction of the last man by Fukuyama, who argues that it is an inadequate analysis of the modern world. He believes that a Hegelian/Kojévian interpretation of modern democracy is a nobler interpretation because it gives a central place to *isothymia*. Moreover, certain developments in recent decades speak against the bourgeois interpretation and for one based on *isothymia*.

If modernity implied the domination of the last man, modern man would be content to live in Hobbes’s authoritarian state of property owners. According to Hobbes, reason and desire lead men to the domination by a sovereign who guarantees safety so that individuals can pursue the acquisition of goods in peace. In this situation they would have to lay down *thymos*, or in Hobbes’s terms, their “vain-glory.” As he states in the *Leviathan*, “The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them.”²⁹ In other words, the last man would be content to live under an authoritarian regime as long as his safety and comfort are guaranteed. However, in order to understand the prevalence of modern democracy, we have to look to other sources of motivation. According to Fukuyama, the “End of History” is characterized by the twin victory of capitalism and of democracy. Moving toward capitalism would have satisfied the last man. Yet what we have witnessed recently is also a move toward democracy. Hobbesian

regimes that provided well for their citizens in terms of income growth, stability, and security have been cast off in Spain, Greece, Taiwan, South Korea, and many other countries.³⁰ In many of the struggles for democracy, people had to forfeit their desire for self-preservation. In other words, the longing not to be the subject of a ruler and to be treated as an individual with dignity points toward *thymos*. Similarly, the rights movements in their different forms are not grounded primarily in the desire for material welfare but, rather, in the desire to be recognized as an individual with worth. Of course, economic motivations play a role in many protest movements, but what is important is that in several cases these democratization movements struggled against regimes that were performing very well on the economic front. Fukuyama even states that there is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that market-oriented authoritarian modernizers do better economically than their democratic counterparts. Yet as a political regime, democracy is flourishing. People value democracy not primarily for economic reasons but because democracies acknowledge the dignity and worth of every individual, and this is why this form of *thymos* can be called *isothymia*. So, if we interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as a theory of the ascent of the last man, as Strauss and Fukuyama do, then Fukuyama opposes it with the *thymiotic* quality of the struggle to be recognized as equals. This struggle is thymiotic in the sense that the desire for self-preservation, which characterizes the last man, is often forfeited in the struggle for democracy.

But what about Nietzsche's remarks on modern struggles, such as his characterization of the French Revolution as a slave revolt? Fukuyama mentions Nietzsche's critique of equality, but he does not engage him on this account. Fukuyama believes *isothymia* to be a source of human dignity, stating that "it is difficult for those who believe in liberal democracy to follow Nietzsche very far down the road he takes."³¹ Fukuyama takes many insights from Nietzsche concerning human life and modernity in particular, but he does not follow him all the way in his critique of equality. On this point, Fukuyama only states that he differs with Nietzsche but does not elaborate. After discussing some psychological observations from Nietzsche concerning resentment, comfort, and self-overcoming, which Fukuyama holds to be true, he states that "all of these insights may be considered accurate reflections of the human condition, which we can accept without our having to break with the Christian-liberal traditions in which we live."³² For a more direct confrontation with Nietzsche, we have to turn to Fukuyama's second response to the last man.

II. *MEGALOTHYMIA*

With the concept of *isothymia*, Fukuyama seeks to characterize modern man in a way that is more thymiotic than the last man. However, Nietzsche cared little for the modern struggle for equality, calling it a slave revolt, and Nietzsche's bigger concern regarding the modern world was the loss of what can be called

megalothymia in Fukuyama's terms. Consider the following remark from *Zarathustra*: "One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion. No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse" (Z P:5). In *GM*, Nietzsche coins the term *Misarchismus* for this abhorrence of rule, which he describes as "the democratic idiosyncrasy of being hostile to everything that rules and wants to rule" (*GM* II:12). In other words, where *isothymia* rules, *megalothymia* is precluded: no one seeks to be the best, and all become herd. Fukuyama's second reply to the Nietzschean depiction of the last man is his analysis of the sites of *megalothymia* that are still existent at the end of history. He argues that in the modern world, outlets for *megalothymia*, the desire to be the best, are still present in three fields. In these fields the ambitions of Caesars or Napoleons may not be fulfilled, but they do establish a more thymiotic world than that of the last man.

In the first place, Fukuyama turns toward the economy. Traditionally, this field has been characterized as the domain of the desires for material possessions and comfort. However, we need to be attentive to what he calls "the thymiotic origins of work."³³ Adam Smith already argued that most of the things we want relate to prestige rather than just comfort. More importantly, Fukuyama argues that part of the stability of capitalist democracies lies in the fact that the most ambitious natures are drawn to business rather than politics, the army, or the church, where they could wreak havoc. Whereas doing hard work was considered of low esteem in aristocratic societies, it has become a prime means of distinction in the modern world. This infusion of *thymos* can be seen by the fact that many businesspeople simply work too many hours to enjoy their money. It is prestige and recognition by peers that drive such people. They do not risk their lives, but they do stake their fortunes, status, and reputations for a certain glory; they forsake small pleasures, and their entrepreneurial spirit can be seen as a struggle against the domination of nature. In this sense, modern scientists also belong to this group. The daring capitalist entrepreneur as described by Joseph Schumpeter and the innovative scientist are megalothymiotic figures at the end of history.³⁴

Second, politics still provides an outlet for *megalothymia*. The vision of politics underlying Nietzsche's remarks on the last man and *Misarchismus* seems to be that of a kind of Weberian bureaucratic rule.³⁵ This differs greatly from other concepts of politics such as that of the authors of the Federalist Papers. Indeed, they feared the excesses of *megalothymia*, but rather than seeking to neutralize it as in a Weberian bureaucracy, they developed the idea of checks and balances to harness it. Institutions must be crafted in such a way so that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."³⁶ This idea bears some resemblance to Nietzsche's depiction of the *agon* in antiquity in "Homer's Wettkampf" (*HC*, *KSA* 1). Moreover, if we turn from domestic politics to foreign policy, a less checked form of *megalothymia* can be exerted. Great ambition can still be

pursued in the fields of diplomacy and conflict management. We can think here of an example such as Winston Churchill. Fukuyama raises doubts concerning the actual benefits when modern individuals turn their energy to developing countries, but this is nonetheless an outlet for ambition.

A final field of *megalothymia* is that of formal activity. This involves the activities pursued in the arena of sports as well as activity done for pure adventure. In these fields, the conditions of historical struggle like danger, hardship, discipline, and risk of violent death are re-created, but these activities have lost their historical object. Instead, they are performed for the purpose of being the first or the best at something, without there being any substantial historical content in play. The same holds for the arts that have also become purely formal. This idea derives from Kojève's interpretation of the end of history in Japan, which he held to be fundamentally different from its version in the United States. Japanese arts like Noh theater, tea ceremonies, and the art of floral arrangement do not serve any political or economic purpose but are formalist (or a form of snobbery) in the sense that they revolve solely around the perfection of the activity itself.³⁷

As argued in the previous section, Fukuyama here seeks to counter the idea he derives from Nietzsche that modernity tends toward the reign of the last man and hence the decline of *thymos*. It is not clear that Nietzsche's depiction of the last man should be interpreted as a literalist prediction that this would be the only form of human life in modernity, precluding the possibility of human flourishing; several passages that speak against such a reading have already been mentioned. Yet much of what Nietzsche writes on modernity, such as his concept of *Misarchismus*, points toward a concept of modernity in which striving and ambition to rule vanish. In the fields of capitalist entrepreneurship, scientific innovation, foreign policy, and formalist art, Fukuyama discerns sites of ambition, or *megalothymia*, in the modern world. What is interesting is that he seeks to locate *thymos* in spheres in which philosophers are not inclined to look, such as the modern economy. Nonetheless, it is clear that we are dealing with severely tamed versions of *megalothymia* that can hardly make up for the loss that Nietzsche described.

III. THE PERSISTENCE OF THYMIOTIC TRADITIONS

There is a third line of reasoning in Fukuyama on the existence of *thymos* in the modern world, which is present in *The End of History and the Last Man* but is developed most elaborately in his subsequent book *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. Fukuyama turns to a field of research that challenges one of the central assumptions in much of the debate about modernization. Modernity is often assumed to be a point or process toward which all societies converge. As such, it is contrasted with tradition, and in time it is destined to replace tradition entirely. In other words, modernization is held to represent a radical rupture with tradition as individualism undermines long-standing institutions. Fukuyama argues that within the modern world certain traditions, often

in transformed manners, persist and even play vital roles in modern societies. As such, he challenges the view of a radical rupture between modernity and tradition. According to Fukuyama, this persistence of tradition means that old sources of *thymos* also persist in the modern world. We discussed the eclipse of *thymos* in the last man who loses the capacity to strive and discipline himself and instead seeks happiness as comfort. By arguing that certain old traditions persist, Fukuyama claims that modern human beings do not merely live for comfort but are also still motivated by sources of discipline and authority that fostered *thymos* in the past. After elaborating how Nietzsche adhered to the view of a radical rupture between tradition and the modern world, we will turn to Fukuyama's critique of the view. In the preface to *Z*, the last man says, "We have discovered happiness... . In earlier times the world was misled—thus say the finest and blink" (*Z* P:5). The last man sees himself as a radical break with the past, not seeing the shallowness of his existence. In other passages, Nietzsche elaborates how the morality of modernity breaks with the past. In a passage in *TI*, for instance, he states that democratic morality is at odds with institutions. For the existence of institutions a "will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility over centuries, of solidarity between the chain of generations backward and forwards ad infinitum" is required: "The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a *future* grows; perhaps nothing goes so much against the grain of its 'modern spirit'" (*TI* "Skirmishes" 39).³⁸ He goes on to say that the modern idea of freedom makes every authority appear as a form of enslavement. Modern "living for the day" breeds irresponsible living. The passages exhibit a sense of a radical break between modernity and tradition in Nietzsche's thought. Revolts such as those of 1848, when revolutions swept across Europe's major cities, did point toward a large-scale collapse of old institutions, and Reschke has shown that fear of such chaos motivates much of Nietzsche's negative remarks on the masses.³⁹ Against the view of a radical rupture, Fukuyama argues that there is much more continuity between modernity and tradition.

Fukuyama argues that the principles of classical economics go a long way to explain modern economies but cannot account for certain features that are ultimately rooted in the older traditions that persist in modern societies. What classical economics can explain is the behavior of people insofar as it is rational, selfish, and consumptive, the characteristics of the last man. What classical economics cannot explain has to do with behavior informed by tradition and that according to Fukuyama makes modern man more thymiotic than the last man. The central argument of his book *Trust* is that the structure of modern economies is rooted in the patterns of trust that derive from premodern culture. In a low-trust society the "radius" of trust, or the proclivity of individuals to work together, barely extends beyond the family. In high-trust societies people tend to collaborate in wider structures with nonrelated others. Examples of the

former are southern Italy, France, and China, and examples of the latter are the United States, Germany, and Japan. As a consequence of this different social proclivity, companies tend to remain family owned and managed in low-trust societies, preventing them from becoming larger, more professional, and more innovative. The greater social proclivity of high-trust societies makes them more capable of professionalization and innovation.

In countries like the United States and Germany, the Protestant ethic of personal accountability to God, overriding the claims of the family, greatly contributed to the broadening of the radius of trust. By contrast, in China there is no authority that overrules the bonds of filial piety (*jia*). The large and strong companies of Japan (*keiretsu*) are grounded on networks of trust and honor that date back to feudal times. These businesses derived from structures dominated by feudal lords (*daimyo*) and protected by the samurai. In the process of modernization the classical code of honor of the samurai, the Bushido ethic, was extended toward the larger population. After World War II this ethic was demilitarized, but it persisted in a transformed manner in economic life. The extreme loyalty of workers and managers, the system of lifetime employment, and the prestige linked to work are all grounded in this Bushido ethic.⁴⁰ Classical economics that describes the behavior of the last man cannot entirely explain the Japanese economy because it is also animated by the thymiotic Bushido warrior ethic. Similarly, the strength of Germany in the field of complex engineering cannot solely be explained by the laws of economics. Concepts of work and an emphasis on long and extended practical education go back to the medieval guild system. The pride in work and the emphasis on rank in the workplace have premodern origins. Another example Fukuyama gives is the success of state-led development in East Asia. This has not had the same success in other parts of the world, because in East Asia it goes back to traditions of high esteem for officials and bureaucrats (highest on the social ladder in Confucianism) and high degrees of professional ethos on the side of officials.⁴¹

These analyses highlight the extent to which ancient traditions persist in the modern world, even in the sphere of economics. Instead of breaking with the past, there is much more continuity in history. Although many institutions have collapsed, the “modern democratic spirit” does not lead to the complete dissolution of old institutions. The modern economy is driven by motives other than the purely material pursuit of comfort. In new forms, ancient authorities still command respect and motivate people, infusing the modern world with traditional *thymos*. Moreover, Fukuyama argues, these are not simple remnants of the past set to disappear in the future but, instead, critically underpin the modern world because they determine, for instance, the success societies have in terms of innovation and economies of scale.⁴² In several cases, the competitive advantage of a country is grounded in its traditional culture.

As we already saw in Fukuyama's second line of reasoning, the *megalothymia* Nietzsche praised of the past has become rare in the modern world. With the persistence of traditions, Fukuyama points to another source of *thymos* in the modern world. What has to be noted here is that many of these traditions had to be transformed (often tamed). However, what remains of modern man is more than Nietzsche's depiction of the last man. The will to tradition, authority, and responsibility has not perished, and people remain motivated by other things than only comfort and security. Traditional *thymos* counterbalances the world of the last man.

Evaluating Fukuyama's Response to Nietzsche

We saw that Nietzsche argues that the modern democratic spirit leads to a weakening of mankind. Although Nietzsche pursues several lines of reasoning from this position, including arguments that modern democracy facilitates the creation of strong individuals, Strauss and Fukuyama take up the line that culminates in the figure of the last man, and they take it very seriously: in terms of the eclipse of *thymos*. From this point of view, Nietzsche's project of *grosse Politik* as a way out of the process of the weakening of man can be interpreted as a way to preserve *thymos* through the creation of a caste of people living under conditions separate from the rest of mankind and separated from them. We saw that Leo Strauss agreed with Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity as the victory of the last man. He did not follow Nietzsche in the project of *grosse Politik* and was hence led to skepticism about the possibilities for human flourishing. Fukuyama's response is to challenge the underlying idea that the modern world represents the decline of *thymos*. He argues that, in the forms *isothymia*, (tamed versions of) *megalothymia*, and the persistence of certain traditional institutions, the modern world still is thymiotic. If Nietzsche's social theory is understood to lay bare a logic that leads to the eclipse of *thymos* and the world of the last man, then Fukuyama's first two arguments introduce significant qualifications to this theory. Apart from consumerist last men, modern humanity is also a site for the struggle for *isothymia*. However, Nietzsche's objection still stands that the character of this struggle, which Fukuyama sees as a struggle for dignity, is reactive, that is, a slave revolt. Fukuyama's second response establishes that rather than a complete "abhorrence of rule," some form of the desire to rule persists in certain spheres, albeit in a diminished or tamed way. Fukuyama's third response poses a stronger challenge to the logic by discerning the way in which traditional sites of *thymos* persist in the modern world. This claim also goes to the heart of concerns of the neoconservative movement.⁴³

By identifying these three fields of *thymos*, Fukuyama provides a third way next to Straussian *skepsis* and Nietzschean *grosse Politik*. In order to assess

the viability of this third way, we first need to look at the broader context of the confrontation between Nietzsche and Fukuyama. Although Fukuyama's interpretation of Nietzsche's last man and the eclipse of *thymos* is an interesting way of appropriating Nietzsche's work that opens new perspectives on contemporary thought, Fukuyama seems to miss a central concern in Nietzsche's philosophy that would pose a fundamental challenge to his project. While the weakening of mankind is an important concern for Nietzsche and runs through much of his work, the eclipse of *thymos*, so central to Fukuyama's interpretation, seems to be of lesser concern to him. In his writings on the last man as well as on *grosse Politik* something bigger is at stake: the advent of nihilism. Nietzsche's remarks on the last man should be read in light of *Zarathustra's* project to create new values in the face of the nihilistic devaluation of all values. Similarly, his *grosse Politik* represents a site to strengthen individuals and hence work for the flourishing of humankind. But the project is meant to create those who are capable of creating new values and maintain the capacity to command against the background of nihilism. One of the first instances in which the theme of *grosse Politik* appears is in the notes of May–June 1885, in which Nietzsche introduces *grosse Politik* as a condition for the creation of new values:

Fundamental idea: the new values must first be created—we are not *spared* this! The philosopher must be like a law-giver. New kinds

The new philosopher can only arise in connection with a ruling caste, as its highest spiritualization. Great politics [*grosse Politik*], earth-governance from close up; complete *lack of principles* for that—(irony towards the empty German spirit). (KSA 11:35[47])

This resembles the passage cited earlier in which Nietzsche anticipates a new ruling caste as the condition for Zarathustra's project (KSA 11:35[73]).

Fukuyama does not address the issue of nihilism in his work. By interpreting Nietzsche as the spokesman of *thymos*, he only partially takes on the crisis Nietzsche is addressing. What are the implications of such an appropriation? Does this mean that Fukuyama does not go to the heart of the matter? It may seem that his embrace of a Hegelian/Kojévian view of human beings places him within the tradition of the Enlightenment, blinding him to the crisis of that project that Nietzsche proclaimed. This is especially problematic for the modern form of *thymos* that Fukuyama identifies as *isothymia*. The context of nihilism poses a challenge to Fukuyama's struggle for recognition, as the devaluation of all values entails the loss of human worth. In a sense, this difficulty gets to the heart of the matter. For although Fukuyama does not address this issue directly in his interpretation of Nietzsche, his thought does provide leads for pursuing a confrontation with him.

Strauss was skeptical about the possibility of the creation of new values. In *Natural Right and History*, he discusses a pivotal source for the modern crisis of values also found in some of Nietzsche's remarks.⁴⁴ He states that it has

become problematic to ground values as our modern worldview, informed by natural science, has made it impossible for us to have a teleological view of the world and man. Mechanistic physics and evolutionary biology have left us with a world deprived of values, undermining normativity and teaching us struggle and chaos. In a passage from *GS*, “the madman” counters the ideology of modern atheists by addressing the issue of nihilism (*GS* 125). Whereas atheists laugh at the death of God, the madman asserts that without God, the foundation for all sense of purpose, including the ideology of atheists, has been undermined. In his work, Fukuyama raises the question of the foundation of this view of humanity in relation to modern science.

In *The Great Disruption*, he addresses the issue of what modern natural science teaches us about human nature and specifically what it teaches us about cooperation and society in general. He analyzes a research field that integrates the work of biologists such as Richard Dawkins and Matt Ridley, neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio, and economists in the field of game theory. What emerges is the view that the values of cooperation not only are sensible from an evolutionary perspective but are ingrained in our nature. This challenges the belief that modern natural science undermines all values of cooperation and society. Nevertheless, even if this is the case, it is not clear how this would counter nihilism, let alone create new values.

A more interesting dialogue can be set up on the basis of Fukuyama’s third response to Nietzsche’s last man in which he challenges the dominant view that there is a radical rupture between modernity and tradition. For the most part, the analysis of the modern world has been predicated on the vision that in time, all old values will vanish and societies will become more individualistic, more secular, and alike. The persistence of traditional values challenges that vision. Indeed, against many expectations, we are witnessing a resurgence of traditional values and religion. Huntington has argued that cultural and religious identities constitute the dominant fault lines in the post–Cold War period.⁴⁵ Although we do not need to believe that this will lead to grand clashes, there is much evidence that traditional culture and religion are not on the retreat. What is in many ways the most modern society in the world, the United States, is highly religious, and the trend seems to be toward less rather than more secularization.⁴⁶ In Latin America and Africa religiosity is growing, and most obviously in the Islamic world, religion in the public sphere is surging. In many ways, traditional culture has to be adapted to the modern condition, but this looks more like Tocqueville’s civil religion than like Comte’s positivist society where traditional values are a thing of the past. Gilles Kepel’s *La Revanche de Dieu* has highlighted the resurgence of religion in the contemporary world.⁴⁷ Peter Berger summarizes, “The world today with some exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it ever was and some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled ‘secularization theory’

is essentially mistaken.”⁴⁸ This does not mean that this is a situation we should embrace, but it does paint a different picture of the process of modernization. Fukuyama’s silence on the issue of nihilism stems from a different diagnosis of our contemporary situation. Rather than being in the situation of a crisis of values and the need for new values, our modern world is much more traditional than we think. Fukuyama suggests that our situation may be different from the world Nietzsche envisioned. It is not entirely clear what Nietzsche’s response to this would be, but it seems clear that from a Nietzschean perspective, one can question the viability or vitality of contemporary religious movements. Regarding nihilism, Nietzsche writes that we can remain attached to values and ideals in which we can no longer believe: “*New battles*—After Buddha was dead, people still pointed to his shadow in a cave for hundreds of years,—an enormous eerie shadow. God is dead: but as mankind is, there might still be caves for millennia to come, in which men will point to his shadow.—And we—we must also battle his shadows!” (GS 108; my translation). Fukuyama and Nietzsche differ from each other on the question of whether the persistence of traditional culture and religion in the modern world is viable or in the end hollow. It is this question, I suggest, that would be at stake in the endgame between Fukuyama and Nietzsche.

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NOTES

1. Alan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1987), pt. 2.
2. Most of this confrontation can be found in Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
3. Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 48–49.
4. Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). There he argues that there can be no universal science of public administration as local knowledge plays a pivotal role in state capacity.
5. For a more elaborate discussion of this difference and the argument of Fukuyama, see P. Sloterdijk, *Zorn und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006), chap. 1.
6. Plato, *Politeia*, pt. 5, 427d–444e (London: Penguin Classics, 1987), 137–63.
7. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), pt. 2, chap. 17, 223.
8. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, chap. 13, 185.
9. Sloterdijk, *Zorn und Zeit*, 27–28. Here Sloterdijk argues that even though some psychoanalysts acknowledge a second psychic force (“Tödestrieb” or “Destrudo”), in general psychoanalysis interprets the phenomena of *thymos* as sublimation of the erotic.
10. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, chaps. 12–13.
11. *Nachlass* texts in this article were translated by Herman Siemens based on the KSA.
12. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 189.
13. The translation is from W. Kaufmann, trans., *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 129.
14. See note 23 below. Other passages where Nietzsche connects the *Übermensch* with the new ruling caste include KSA 11:35[72–74], 12:10[17].

15. As stated above, I am following a certain line of reasoning in Nietzsche. In other passages, the argument can be quite different. *BGE* 44 is very similar to the quoted passage, but instead Nietzsche argues there that the conditions for danger *as well as* their opposite have allowed man to grow strong. From such a view the practical proposals of *grosse Politik* that I track here do not follow.

16. Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).

17. Urs Marti, "Ist das Tier, das Versprechen darf, ein Zoon Politikon?" *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 41 (1993): 893. Marti shows the pragmatic character of Nietzsche's deliberations on the conditions for the higher caste (*Der grosse Pöbel- und Sklavenaufstand. Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit Revolution und Demokratie* [Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993], 212, 233).

18. Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity," in *An Introduction to Political Philosophy* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 81–99; Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), chap. 6, "The Crisis of Modern Natural Right," 252–53.

19. Strauss, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 97.

20. Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 238.

21. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 34.

22. Strauss, *On Tyranny*, 291.

23. There is much speculation on a hidden agenda and an esoteric philosophy in Strauss (derived from his work on "the art of writing"). The argument is that in our time there is a radical difference between those who can stand the meaninglessness of existence and those who cannot. The former are to distance themselves from the latter and rule them with "noble lies." These authors claim to be inspired by Nietzsche. This interpretation is argued for in S. B. Drury, *The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

24. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 309–11. As already noted, this interpretation of Nietzsche ignores other lines of thought in his work. In *BGE* 200, for instance, Nietzsche states that times of contradictory values create weaker people but can also create powerful individuals, citing Alcibiades, Caesar, and Leonardo da Vinci as examples.

25. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 182.

26. Urs Marti, however, has shown that during his middle period, Nietzsche tended toward a more positive evaluation of democracy. See Marti, *Der grosse Pöbel- und Sklavenaufstand*, 190–94.

27. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, IV.A (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), 127–36.

28. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, chap. 13, "In the Beginning, a Battle to the Death for Pure Prestige," 155–56.

29. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pt. 1, chap. 13, 188.

30. S. P. Huntington has analyzed the global spread of democracy since 1974 in his work *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

31. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 313.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, chap. 21.

34. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Democracy and Socialism* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1976), pt. 2.

35. Max Weber, *Economy and Society II* (London: University of California Press, 1978), chap. 11.

36. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, number LI (London: Penguin Classics, 1989), 320.

37. In a famous note A. Kojève writes, “‘Post-historical’ Japanese civilization undertook ways diametrically opposed to the ‘American way.’ No doubt, there were no longer in Japan any Religion, Morals, or Politics in the ‘European’ or ‘historical’ sense of the words. But snobbery in its pure form created disciplines negating the ‘natural’ or ‘animal’ given which in effectiveness far surpassed those that arose, in Japan or elsewhere, from ‘historical’ Action—that is, from warlike and revolutionary Fights or from forced Work” (*Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* [New York: Cornell University Press, 1980], 161–62).

38. Kaufmann’s translation emended.

39. R. Reschke, “Die Angst vor dem Chaos. Friedrich Nietzsches Plebiszit gegen die Masse,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 18 (1989): 290–300.

40. Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1996), pts. 2–3, specifically chaps. 8 and 14.

41. See Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah’s article “Economic and Political Development in East Asia and Latin America: Discerning Differences,” http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/fukuyama/articles/dimensions_of_development.htm (March 1, 2008).

42. This alternative is thematized in Francis Fukuyama’s book *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: Touchstone, 2000), in which he deals with the radically disruptive effect of individualism since the sixties. He concludes that currently we are witnessing signs of a reconstitution of social order like those that happened earlier with the Great Awakenings.

43. Other prominent neoconservatives have also argued that the traditions they seek to preserve are threatened by modernity but have nevertheless played a critical role in shaping the modern world. Gertrude Himmelfarb, for instance, argues that we cannot speak of one Enlightenment but must distinguish among a British, French, and American Enlightenment, rooted in three different national traditions (*The Roads to Modernity* [New York: Vintage Books, 2005]).

44. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, chap. 2, “Natural Right and the Distinction Between Facts and Values.”

45. S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997).

46. Different fertility rates change the demographic composition of the United States. The more religious communities are becoming a larger share of the population of the country.

47. G. Kepel, *La Revanche de Dieu* (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1991).

48. Quoted in P. Norris and R. Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4.